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RECENT ILLINOIS DECISIONS
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION-PERSONS ENTITLED AND THEIR RESPEC-
TIVE SHARES--WHETHER DEATH OF ONE ENTITLED TO ELECT EITHER
DOWER OR STATUTORY FEE WITHIN TIME FOR ELECTION OPERATES AS A
WAIVER OF DowER-The Illinois Supreme Court appears to have estab-
lished some new law when called upon to interpret and apply Section 19
of the Probate Act' to the facts involved in the recent case of Krile v.
Suiney.2 In that case, a married woman died intestate while the owner
in fee simple of a tract of land. She left no lineal descendants but was
survived by her husband and certain collateral relatives. The husband
died less than ten months after letters of administration had been issued
on the estate of the wife and prior to taking any action with respect to
dower in the lands owned by the wife. Certain purchasers from the wife's
heirs at law thereafter sought to quiet title to the land as against the
heirs at law of the husband on the theory that, as the surviving spouse
had died during the period within which he could have elected to perfect
his dower right, the title to the property should be treated as if he had
made such an election, had acquired no more than a life interest therein,
and had nothing to leave to his heirs upon his death. The trial court
agreed with that theory but, on direct appeal to the Supreme Court as a
freehold interest was involved,3 the decree was reversed when the higher
court achieved the principle that, under a proper interpretation of the
statute in question, a statutory fee interest had vested in the surviving
spouse immediately upon the death of the owner of the land, subject,
however, to a condition subsequent that no election to take dower occurred
during the lifetime of the surviving spouse and within the time fixed by
law.
The decision in the instant case completely reverses the law which
previously controlled in this type of problem. The case of Braidwood v.
Charles4 had indicated that waiver of dower was a condition precedent
to the vesting of a fee interest in the surviving spouse; that where a
surviving spouse had died within the period of election, without exercising
his election to waive right to dower, the dower right, being for life only,
was extinguished and the right to election had terminated; and that the
heirs of the surviving spouse, as a consequence, would inherit nothing
in the realty in question. This position was subjected to severe criticism, 5
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 171.
2413 Ill. 350, 109 N. E. (2d) 189 (1952).
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 199.
4327 Il. 500, 159 N. E. 38 (1927).
5 See note in 23 Ill. L. Rev. 169.
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and a new provision was introduced by the new Probate Act, one which
requires the surviving spouse to act to perfect his right to dower during
his lifetime or be forever barred thereof.6 The decision reached in the
instant case hinged on the words "during his lifetime," words which
appeared for the first time in the new statute, for the court held that, by
reason of the death of the surviving spouse, dower could no longer be
perfected during his lifetime, hence the fee interest, provided for by other
sections of the statute,7 would continue in existence and pass to his heirs
upon his death.
Perhaps of even greater importance to the law of property is the
fact that the decision in the instant case appears to have effectively re-
versed the position taken in Bruce v. McCormick,8 a case decided under
the present statute. There the problem was somewhat different. The
surviving spouse, in that case, did not die during the election period but
gave a quit-claim deed to a stranger within ten months of her spouse's
death. The question was whether or not, without waiver of dower, the
surviving spouse had a fee interest to pass within that time. The court
held she did not and reasoned that the conveyance was not valid as nothing
short of a total failure of the surviving spouse to elect dower could be
regarded as meeting the terms of a condition precedent to the vesting of a
fee interest.9 Notwithstanding that holding, the court now holds that an
express waiver of, or a total failure to elect, dower is not required as a
condition precedent to the vesting of a fee interest in the surviving spouse,
but that, on the contrary, the fee interest is vested immediately subject to
a possible condition subsequent leading to divestment in the event proper
steps are taken, within a proper time, to perfect dower in the manner
specified by the statute.
ILLEGITIMATES-PROPERTY-WHET1IER AN ILLEGITIMATE COLLATERAL
HEIR, OR His DESCENDANTS, ARE ENTITLED TO TAKE PROPERTY BY DESCENT
-The recurrence of what had been regarded as a settled question of law
developed, in the case of Spencer v. Burns,' because of some apparent
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 171.
7 Ibid., Ch. 3, §§ 162, 163 and 168.
8396 Ill. 482, 72 N. E. (2d) 333 (1947), noted in 25 CHICAGo-KEIfT LAW REVIEW
324.
9 The position taken in Bruce v. McCormick could no longer be maintained for
another reason. By a provision added in 1951, following the decision therein, a
surviving spouse who should make a conveyance of real estate, or of all interest
therein, prior to the time when the right to claim dower would be barred, is
thereby estopped from electing to take dower: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 3,
§ 173a.
1413 Ill. 240, 108 N. E. (2d) 413 (1952), noted in 41 Ill. B. J. 210.
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changes made by the legislature at the time of the adoption of the present
Probate Act.2 The case was one in which an illegitimate half-brother and
the two grandchildren of a deceased illegitimate half-sister of the de-
ceased came, as intervenors, into a partition suit being conducted between
the alleged husband of the deceased and her legitimate brother. The trial
court decided that the property should be divided equally between the
plaintiff and the defendant but that the intervenors were entitled to
nothing. The Illinois Supreme Court, on direct appeal because a freehold
was involved, affirmed this ruling when it decided that the legislature, at
the time it enacted the present Probate Act, had acted to curtail the
rights of collateral illegitimate relatives of a deceased property owner
who had died intestate.
Prior to the passage of the present statute, the Illinois Supreme Court,
in Morrow v. Morrow3 and in Chambers v. Chambers,4 had held that
collateral illegitimates were entitled to inherit under the provisions of the
Descent Act then in force, particularly because the statute then provided
that an illegitimate child was to be the heir of its mother, of any maternal
ancestor, and "of any person from whom its mother might have inherited,
if living.'5 For reasons best known to itself, the legislature, at the time
of the adoption of the present statute, saw fit to delete the quoted phrase.
As the right to inherit, sustained in the earlier cases, had rested on this
precise clause, the court correctly concluded that, with the elimination
thereof, the older decisions were no longer controlling.
It, nevertheless, proceeded to analyze the present provision to deter-
mine whether or not a right of inheritance could rest upon an added
phrase which states that, in all cases where representation is provided for,
an "illegitimate child represents his mother."6 Since there is no provision
in the present Probate Act for representation when one of the parents is
deceased, the court considered an argument based on this line of reason-
ing to be ineffective. The only remaining avenue left open to the claimants
was to assert that they were heirs of their mother and "of any maternal
ancestor." In that regard, the court, defining "maternal ancestor" for
the first time in Illinois, said that an ancestor is one who has preceded
another in a direct line of descent, i. e. a lineal ascendant. 7 Acceptance of
that view necessarily operates to cut off collateral heirs.
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 163, formed the basis for the Inquiry.
3 289 111. 135, 124 N. E. 386, 24 A. L. R. 561 (1919).
4 249 111. 126, 94 N. E. 108 (1911).
5 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 39, § 2.
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 163.
7 Pratt v. Atwood, 108 Mass. 40 (1871).
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The court opined that it was barred from granting relief to the
intervenors when the legislative intent and direction to the contrary was
so clearly indicated,8 but it did infer that a contrary result would be
socially more desirable and more in keeping with a modern policy to
broaden the rights of illegitimate persons. Action by the legislature to
restore the deleted phrase, if it should consider the result attained in the
instant case to be an undesirable one, would seem to be the only way in
which the situation could be rectified.
JOINT TENANCY-TERMINATION-WHETHER op NOT THE ENTRY OF AN
INTERLOCUTORY DECREE FOR PARTITION WILL SEVER A JOINT TENANCY-
Unresolved questions concerning the effectiveness of acts designed to
terminate a joint tenancy faced the Illinois Supreme Court in the recent
case of Schuck v. Schuck.1 The case was one in which a joint tenant,
naming his co-tenant as a defendant, sought partition of the real estate
owned in joint tenancy. 2 The court, finding the land to be held in joint
tenancy, decreed that each of the parties was entitled to an undivided
one-half interest therein and ordered that partition be made. No appeal
was prosecuted from such decree. Thereafter, commissioners were ap-
pointed and, on their report that division of the property could not be
made, a special master was directed to sell the land. Again no appeal was
prosecuted. The special master then filed a report stating that the
property had been sold, that he had received a down payment, and that
the purchaser would be entitled to a deed upon confirmation of the sale
and payment of the balance. Before further proceedings could be taken,
the plaintiff died. The defendant, with leave of court, then filed a supple-
mental counterclaim in which she recited the foregoing facts, alleged that
the joint tenancy had not been severed, claimed to be the sole owner of
the land, and asked that the master's report of sale be set aside and that
the complaint for partition be dismissed. The trial court entered a decree
in favor of defendant in which it disapproved the sale and dismissed the
complaint for partition. The Supreme Court, however, on appeal trans-
ferred to it,3 reversed and remanded the case on the ground that the unity
of possession, necessary for the creation and maintenance of every estate
8The decision would also appear to have overruled the holding in Calamia v.
Dempsey, 344 Ill. App. 503, 101 N. E. (2d) 611 (1951), noted in 40 Ill. B. J. 289.
1413 Ill. 390, 108 N. E. (2d) 905 (1952).
2 I1. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 106, § 44, authorizes a court to decree partition
when lands are held in joint tenancy as well as when the parties hold as tenants
in common.
3 Cause transferred: 347 Ill. App. 557, 107 N. E. (2d) 53 (1952). Transfer was
proper because a freehold interest was involved: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2,
Ch. 110, § 199(1) and § 210.
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in joint tenancy, had been lost when the interlocutory decree for partition
had been entered, as a consequence of which defendant was entitled to no
more than an undivided one-half interest in the premises.
The law is well settled that a joint tenancy will be terminated by the
severance of one or more of the unities necessary to create and to maintain
that type of interest.4 On the basis thereof, it has been held that a joint
tenancy will be terminated by an involuntary sale,5 by a conveyance by
one of the joint tenants, 6 the placing of a mortgage on the undivided
interest of one of the joint tenants,7 and also by an agreement between
the joint tenants to hold as tenants in common,8 for, in each of these
instances, a complete and final severance has occurred. It is equally
well settled law that a decree for partition, being a judicial determination
designed to settle the rights of the parties, will produce a final determina-
tion on the point unless an appeal is taken therefrom.9 It should be
occasion for no surprise, therefore, that the combination of these two
factors should produce the result it did in the instant case. While the
precise point had never been presented in Illinois prior to this case, the
decision serves to add another factual illustration concerning the variety
of ways by which a joint tenancy may be terminated. 10
LANDLORD AND TENANT-PREMISES, AND ENJOYMENT AND USE THEREOF
-WHETE~R OR NOT LANDLORD OWES DUTY TO TENANT TO REMOVE SNOW
AND ICE FROM PRIVATE WALK USED TO ENTER LEASED PREMISES--The
plaintiff, in Cronin v. Brownlie,1 was a tenant who had slipped and fallen
on a private sidewalk, located on the lessor's land and used by all the
tenants of the premises, because the same became icy and dangerous due
to natural conditions. There was no provision in the written lease existing
4 Tindall v. Yeats, 392 Ill. 502, 64 N. E. (2d) 903 (1946).
5 Jackson v. Lacey, 408 Ill. 530, 97 N. E. (2d) 839 (1951), noted in 30 CHICAGO-
KENT LAw REviEw 189.
6 Szymczak v. Szymczak, 306 Ill. 541, 138 N. E. 218 (1923).
7 Tindall v. Yeats, 392 Ill. 502, 64 N. E. (2d) 903 (1946).
8 Dunkin v. Suhy, 378 Ill. 104, 37 N. E. (2d) 826 (1941). Other aspects of the
case were transferred to, and decided by, the Appellate Court in Sibert v. Suhy,
315 Ill. App. 147, 42 N. E. (2d) 636 (1942).
9 Rabe v. Rabe, 386 Ill. 600, 54 N. E. (2d) 518 (1944).
10 In a still later case, that of Klouda v. Pechousek, 414 Il1. 75, 110 N. E. (2d)
258 (1953), it was held that a conveyance of land, registered under the Torrens
System in the names of joint tenants, given by one of the joint tenants but
intended not to take effect until the death of the grantor, was effective, imme-
diately upon delivery, to destroy the joint tenancy, despite the fact that the deed
was not offered for registration until after the grantor's death. The decision
extends the holding of Szymczak v. Szymczak, 306 Ill. 541, 138 N. E. 218 (1923),
so as to make the rule thereof apply to registered lands.
1348 Il. App. 448, 109 N. E. (2d) 352 (1952).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
between the plaintiff and the defendant-lessor imposing any duty on the
lessor to keep the sidewalk clear of ice and snow. Plaintiff instituted an
action for personal injuries and recovered a judgment against the defend-
ant in the trial court, which court denied motions made on behalf of the
defendant for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. Thereafter, the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court for
the Second District. That tribunal reversed the judgment, without re-
manding, on the ground that, in the absence of a special agreement, no
duty rests upon an Illinois landlord to remove a natural accumulation
of snow and ice from a private sidewalk used in common by the several
tenants.
Prior to the instant decision, no Illinois reviewing court appears to
have had occasion to consider this particular problem. Nevertheless, the
question is not a novel one in many jurisdictions and, in those states
where the situation has arisen, there appears to be diversity of opinion
as to the liability of the landlord. 2 The distinction between the two views
seems to lie in the extent to which the rule that a landlord is bound to
keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition should be made to apply.
The majority view on the point excludes all those unsafe conditions which
arise solely from natural causes, imposing liability only where there has
been a failure to make general repairs. The minority view, by contrast,
imposing liability upon the landlord even for natural conditions, is based
on the premise that there is no logical basis for limiting liability Solely to
those cases where the negligence grows from a structural defect in the
premises.3 It is, therefore, the opinion of the minority view that the
landlord's duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition
carries with it a duty to remove natural obstructions such as ice and
snow. The Illinois case at hand appears to have accepted what would
appear to be the majority rule on the point.
It should be noted, however, that the operation of either of these
rules, as applied to natural accumulations of ice and snow, is subject to
conditions. Protection may be denied to the landlord, under the first of
these views, if it can be made to appear that he has, either expressly or
impliedly, assumed the burden of removing the ice and snow.4 In that
2 See, for example, Rosenberg v. Chapman Nat. Bank, 126 Me. 403, 139 A. 82
(1927); Boulton v. Dorrington, 302 Mass. 407, 19 N. E. (2d) 731 (1939); Burke
v. O'Neil, 192 Minn. 442, 257 N. W. 81 (1934) ; Turoff v. Richman, 76 Ohio App. 83,
61 N. E. (2d) 486 (1944); Oerter v. Ziegler, 59 Wash. 421, 109 P. 1058 (1910).
The opposite result has been achieved in United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. Paine,
26 F. (2d) 594, 58 A. L. R. 1398 (1928) ; Reardon v. Shimelman, 102 Conn. 383,
128 A. 705 (1925) ; Boyle v. Baldowski, 117 N. J. 320, 188 A. 233 (1936).
3 See, for example, Massor v. Yates, 137 Ore. 569, 3 P. (2d) 784 (1931).
4 Miller v. Berk, - Mass. -, 104 N. E. (2d) 163 (1952) ; Carey v. Malley, 327
Mass. 189, 97 N. E. (2d) 645 (1951).
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connection, it is important to notice that the act of the landlord must
be more than a mere gratuity; it must be of such a nature as to create
a legal duty, the breach of which would constitute negligence.5 On the
other hand, the minority view will not impose liability if it can be shown
that the landlord had no notice of the unsafe condition.' It should also
be noted that the rule, as adopted by the Illinois court, is applicable only
to defects brought about solely by natural causes. In other words, if the
accumulation of ice and snow could be shown to have been caused, at
least partially, by a structural defect in the premises, the rule might not
operate to absolve the landlord from liability, unless it could also be
shown that the landlord was under no obligation to cure even structural
defects.
7
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-STATUTES or LIMITATION-WHETHER OR
NOT ADDITION OF LIMITATION CLAUSE TO ILLINOIS DRAM SHOP ACT OPER-
ATES TO BAR A CAUSE OF ACTION WHICH HAD ACCRUED PIOR TO DATE
OF SUCH AMENDMENT-A proceeding to recover damages under the Illi-
nois Dram Shop Act,' based on a cause of action which accrued on
April 20, 1946, was instituted in the recent case of Fourt v. DeLazzer.2
At the time of the injury, and in the absence of any special limitation
clause, it was reasonably believed that actions of this nature could be
instituted within five years. In 1949, however, the legislature amended
the statute so as to provide that dram shop actions should be commenced
within two years next after the cause of action accrued.3 The complaint
in question was apparently filed after the date of the amendment and
more than two years after the cause of action had accrued, but within
the five-year period. Defendants suitably moved to dismiss the suit
on the ground the action was barred, 4 which motion was sustained in
the trial court. The plaintiffs then appealed to the Appellate Court
for the Fourth District but that court affirmed the decision, holding
that the right to bring suit was controlled by the statute in force at
the time of the filing of the complaint rather than by the law in force
when the cause of action first accrued.
5 Smolesky v. Kotler, 270 Mass. 32, 169 N. E. 486 (1930); Bell v. Siegel, 242
Mass. 380, 136 N. E. 109 (1922).
6 Drible v. Village Improvement Co., 123 Conn. 20, 192 A. 308 (1937).
7 Rogers v. Dudley Realty Corp., 301 Mass. 104, 16 N. E. (2d) 244 (1938).
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 43, § 1 et seq.
2348 IlL. App. 191, 108 N. E. (2d) 599 (1952).
3 Laws 1949, p. 816; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 43, § 135.
4 111. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 172(1) (f), authorizes the use of motion
practice In such a case.
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Few cases in Illinois have considered the applicability of limita-
tion statutes to dram shop matters. In one early case,5 the court intimated
that actions brought under the civil liability provisions of the former
statute6 would be controlled by the five-year statute of limitations,7 but,
in a later case,8 based on a penal section of the former statute,9 it was
decided that the two-year section of the limitation law was controlling.' 0
Any doubt on the point, at least with respect to future cases, has now
been laid to rest for the recent legislative enactment makes recourse to
the varying provisions of the general limitation statute unnecessary.
The instant case does, however, present a problem regarding the
method which should be followed in dealing with those causes of action
which had accrued prior to the change in the statute. The answer lies
in arriving at the intention of the legislature, that is in ascertaining
whether the change was intended to be prospective only or was to have
retroactive effect as well. Absent any clear expression of an intent to
make the statute retroactive in character, Illinois courts have generally
been consistent in holding that each new statute should operate in fuituro
only." To overcome this presumption, the court advanced two reasons
why the rule should not operate in the instant case. The first involved
a construction of one word used in the amended statute, the court inrdi-
eating that, if the legislature had used the word "accrues," the act
would have been prospective in operation, but since it used the word
"accrued" the amendment was intended to act retroactively as well.
That argument may be a valid one but it does not provide a strong
foundation for a decision cutting off existing rights.
The second reason, following a doctrine laid down in the case of
Carlin v. Peerless Gas Light Company,12 was to the effect that, where a
limiting clause appears in a statute creating a new liability', such
clause is not to be treated as a statute of limitation but rather as a condi-
tion precedent to liability. According to that theory, a lack of legisla-
tive expression regarding retroactive effect would make no difference;
the act, as amended, would control from the date of the amendment;
5 O'Leary v. Frisby, 17 Ill. App. 553 (1885).
6 Starr & Curtis Ill. Ann. Stat. 1885, Ch. 43, § 9. The text thereof is substantially
similar to the present statute on the subject, cited in note 3 ante, except for the
limitation clause.
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 16.
8 Dabney v. Manion, 155 Ill. App. 238 (1910).
9 See Hurd Ill. Rev. Stat. 1909, Ch. 43, § 8.
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 15.
11 Compare People ex rel. Brenza v. Gilbert, 409 Ill. 29, 97 N. E. (2d) 793
(1951), with Thompson v. Alexander, 11 Ill. 54 (1849).
12283 Ill. 142, 119 N. E. 66 (1917). Carter, Ch. J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
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and one could not complain that a cause of action which arose prior to
the amendment was thereby affected, since such a person would have
no vested right in the cause of action.' s The Carlin decision, however,
was accompanied with a vigorous dissent and, while the case has received
additional support in recent years, 14 echoes of that dissent are still heard.
15
Whether rightly or wrongly decided, the instant decision points out
the wisdom of instituting suit as quickly as possible when rights have
arisen under statutes creating liability since there is always the pos-
sibility that some future amendment might curtail, or even abrogate,
these rights. It also serves to emphasize the fact that law makers, when
creating or amending statutes dealing with periods of limitation, should
indicate more clearly the full purport of their intent so as to leave no
doubts on the subject.
PLEADING-MOTIONS-WHETIER DEFECT IN COMPLAINT, ARISING
FROMx FAILURE To ALLEGE CASE IN THE ALTERNATIVE, IS WAIVED BY DF_-
PENDANT'S FAILURE TO PRESENT MOTION TO DISmss-A significant issue
regarding civil procedure was generated in the recent case of Lustig v.
Hutchinson.' Plaintiff's complaint, naming an alleged principal and his
purported agent as defendants, charged a breach of a contract of hiring
and sought to recover damages from the principal but, beyond alleging
the fact of agency, made no charge, either in the alternative or in a sep-
arate count,2 against the purported agent. The sufficiency of the complaint
was not challenged by motion, but each defendant filed an answer by way
of denial. At the trial, a judgment was rendered in favor of the alleged
principal, probably because plaintiff was unable to prove authority on
the agent's part to act in the principal's behalf, but judgment was given
for plaintiff against the agent-defendant. On that defendant's appeal, a
majority of the Appellate Court for the First District, while recognizing
the vulnerability of the complaint to a motion to dismiss, affirmed the
judgment on the ground the defect in pleading had been cured by the
failure to raise objection thereto. A dissent, however, was registered on
13 See People ex rel. Eltel v. Lindhelmer, 371 Iil. 367, 21 N. E. (2d) 318 (1939).
14 Wilson v. Tromly, 404 Ill. 307, 89 N. E. (2d) 24 (1949), noted in 28 CHICAGO-
KENT LAW REvIEW 274.
15 See Theodosis v. Keeshin, 341 Ill. App. 8 at 19, 92 N. E. (2d) 794 at 799
(1950).
1349 Ill. App. 120, 110 N. E. (2d) 278 (1953). Kiley, J., wrote a dissenting
opinion.
2Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 167(2), provides that, where a party is
in doubt as to which of two or more statements is true, he may state them in the
alternative. Section 148(3) deals with alternative joinder of parties and permits
the statement of the claim in the alternative in the same count or in the form of
separate alternative counts.
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the ground that, as the complaint totally failed to state a case against the
judgment defendant, objection thereto could be made at any time.
It has long been established law in Illinois that an agent who mis-
represents his authority will be held personally liable for any damages
which arise by reason of his misrepresentation. 3 However, in those cases
where an agent has been so held, the theory of his liability has always
been set out in the complaint so as to give the defendant an adequate
opportunity to prepare his defense. In the instant case, the single-count
complaint alleged a contract with the principal, through the agent, but
nowhere in the complaint was allegation made respecting a cause of action
against the agent beyond the fact that he was named as a defendant. The
majority, in affirming the judgment, relied on the doctrine of aider by
verdict, saying the judgment cured any defects in the pleading which
might have been made the subject of a motion to dismiss. Up to this
time, the doctrine of aider by verdict has not been without its limitations.
As was pointed out by the Illinois Supreme Court in the case of Lasko v.
Meier,4 while a judgment will cure a defectively stated cause of action it
will not operate to bar an objection that a complaint totally fails to state
a case, since this defect is never waived or cured other than by a suitable
amendment. This limitation has been recognized many times5 for, while
it is true that the Illinois Civil Practice Act should be liberally construed, 6
such liberality has never reached the point of warranting a judgment,
based upon evidence proving a cause of action, where such cause has not
been set out in the pleadings. Carried to extremes, such a view would
warrant the belief that all pleading could be dispensed with. As the cir-
cumstances involved in the instant case clearly fit the purpose underlying
the enactment of a practice provision for alternative pleading,7 it is re-
grettable that the majority of the court saw fit to throw the doctrine of
aider by verdict into doubt instead of requiring the plaintiff to cast his
complaint in proper alternative form.
3 Doggett v. Greene, 254 Il. 134, 98 N. E. 219 (1912) ; Chapman v. Illinois Mid-
west Joint Stock Land Bank, 302 Ill. App. 282, 23 N. E. (2d) 744 (1939);
Willoughby v. Brown, 190 Ill. App. 51 (1914).
4 349 111. 71, 67 N. E. (2d) 162 (1946).
5 See, for example, Owens-Illinois Glass Co. v. McKibben, 385 Ill. 245, 52 N. E.
(2d) 177 (1944); Gustafson v. Consumers Sales Agency, Inc., 346 Ill. App. 493,
105 N. E. (2d) 577 (1952).
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 157(3).
7 S. & C. Clothing Co. v. United States Trucking Co., 216 App. Div. 482, 215
N. Y. S. 349 (1926), noted in 26 Col. L. Rev. 901; Lukken v. Francisco, 194 Wis.
569, 217 N. W. 404 (1928), noted in 5 Wis. L. Rev. 41.
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PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-RIGHTS AND LIABILITIFS AS TO THIRD PAR-
TIES-WHETHER OR NOT A PRINCIPAL, LIABLE UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR, MAY BE HELD IN DAMAGES FOR A GREATER AMOUNT
THAN THE AGENT THROUGH WHOM HE AcTED--The recent case of Aldridge
v. Fox' involves one aspect of the doctrine of respondeat superior which
has not heretofore been made the basis of decision in this jurisdiction. The
plaintiff there brought suit for false imprisonment, naming the employer
and the employee as defendants but using separate counts as to each.
Separate forms of verdict were submitted to the jury as to these defend-
ants, without objection, and both defendants were found guilty, although
varying amounts of damages were named in the verdicts with the larger
sum being imposed on the employer. Following separate judgments on
these verdicts, the defendants appealed to the Appellate Court for the
First District contending that it was error to hold the principal liable in a
greater sum than that assessed against the agent, particularly where the
principal was liable solely under the doctrine of respondeat superior and
had not personally participated in the tort. The Appellate Court agreed,
saying that the liability of both the master and servant for the wrongful
act of the servant was to be deemed that of but one tort-feasor, for which
consolidated or unified wrongful act there could be but one satisfaction.
2
The law is well settled that a master and servant may be joined as
defendants in an action in which damages are claimed on account of the
negligent or other wrongful act of the servant, the master being held
under the doctrine of respondeat superior even though not personally at
fault.3 This rule is predicated on the theory that, as both parties are liable
for the consequences of the tort, one action, and one recovery will serve
to terminate the case and avoid the necessity for separate trials. Equally
well settled is the doctrine that a master or a servant may be sued sepa-
rately, but that satisfaction against one will bar a recovery against the
other.4 The instant case, however, becomes important in that it reveals
the procedure to be followed in case a joint action is maintained. Lacking
any precedent in Illinois, the court turned to the New York case of
Sarine v. American Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company of Illinois5
for support for the theory that, while the injured person could choose
which of two he would seek to hold, he could not multiply his damages for
1348 Ill. App. 96, 108 N. E. (2d) 139 (1952). Leave to appeal has been denied.
2 According to a separate per curiam opinion, the plaintiff was, on motion,
allowed to elect to take a judgment against the employer alone, and did so elect.
The judgment against the employer was then affirmed.
3 Lasko v. Meier, 394 Ill. 71, 67 N. f. (2d) 162 (1946).
4 Chicago & Rock Island R. R. Co. v. Hutchins, 34 Ill. 108 (1864).
5 258 App. Div. 653, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 754 (1940).
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a single indivisible injury through the device of suing each in a separate
count.
In that respect, the instant case also provides a contrast to the holding
in Shaw v. Couitney6 where the plaintiff pursued separate and independ-
ent claims against several defendants, although combining them in one
suit because the several wrongs grew out of one transaction.7 The jury
was there allowed to return separate verdicts as to the several defendants
in varying amounts, but the decision is lacking in applicability to the
instant case for the plaintiff there actually advanced separate claims
against the several defendants, seeking to recover against each upon dis-
tinct causes, and the element of respondeat superior was not involved.
Clearly, in such a case, the injured plaintiff might well be entitled to
separate recoveries for varying amounts.
Another striking feature involved in the instant case lies in the fact
that the court did not reverse and remand the judgment but allowed the
plaintiff to elect to take a judgment for the larger sum against the em-
ployer alone at the time he also elected to dismiss the suit and appeal as
to the employee. If the plaintiff had sued only the employer and had
impressed the jury of his right to the larger of the two amounts, little
comment could be made over the fact. Having elected to treat the parties
as joint tort feasors, the plaintiff should have been held to the rule that
only one judgment could be pronounced against the joint tort feasors and,
if such judgment was erroneous as to one, it would have to be reversed
as to both." The court appears to have reasoned that it would be illogical
to compel an injured party to accept the lesser of two judgments where
a single wrong had been committed by a single entity, particularly where
each wrongdoer could have been held liable in a separate action. It ap-
pears, however, to have overlooked the fact that, since the plaintiff had
made his choice, he should have been held to the consequences of his
choice. To permit a plaintiff to proceed in the fashion here allowed invites
an unjustifiable attempt to gamble on the outcome of every case tried
before a jury.
6317 Ill. App. 422, 46 N. E. (2d) 170 (1943), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REvrw 249, affirmed in 385 Ill. 559, 53 N. E. (2d) 432 (1944).
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 148, permits the joining of defendants
against whom liability is asserted either "jointly, severally, or in the alternative."
8 While Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Ch. 110, § 216(e), authorizes a partial reversal, the
same should be read so as to limit the reversal as to one of the parties only in
cases where liability, as to such person, has not been shown to exist: DeMay v.
Brew, 317 Ill. App. 183, 46 N. E. (2d) 138 (1943). For the former practice, see
Seymour v. Richardson Fueling Co., 205 I1. 77, 68 N. E. 716 (1903).
RECENT ILLINOIS DECISIONS
SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS-PUBLIC SCHOOLS-WHETHER A PUB-
LIC SCHOOL DISTRICT, AS A QUASI-MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, IS IMMUNE
FROM TORT LIABILITY WHEN IT CARRIES INSURANC---In the case of
Thomas v. Broadlands Community Consolidated School District No. 201,1
the plaintiff, a minor suing by his next friend, sought to recover for in-
juries caused by the negligence of an agent of the defendant, a public
school district, which injuries were suffered by the plaintiff, a student,
while he was in defendant's playground during a recess. The complaint
charged that the defendant carried public liability insurance and an offer
was made therein to limit the collection of any judgment which might be
recovered to the proceeds of such insurance policy. The defendant moved
to dismiss the suit on the ground that it had been organized as a quasi-
municipal corporation and, as such, was a part of the State of Illinois,
hence was not liable in tort. The trial court sustained the motion and
the suit was dismissed. The matter was then taken, on ai agreed case,
2
to the Appellate Court for the Third District, which court, by way of
answer to certain certified questions,3 held that the defendant, as a quasi-
municipal corporation, was not liable for injuries resulting from a tort
but, to the extent it had provided insurance coverage, it had waived its
immunity from suit. The judgment was, therefore, reversed and the cause
was remanded for further proceedings.
As a general rule a school district, being created as a quasi-municipal
corporation, is to be treated as a part of the state for most purposes, hence
would not be liable in tort for the acts of its servants.4 The doctrine of
immunity from tort so favoring quasi-municipal corporations was estab-
lished at an early date in Illinois,5 but the historical basis therefor is
questionable in character and the only justifiable reason for such im-
munity would seem to be based on the protection it affords for public
funds and public property." In that respect, the doctrine is similar to
the one which was developed, some time later, for the protection of non-
public charitable corporations. 7 This latter doctrine has, in recent years,
been forced to yield to the paramount desire to provide protection for the
injured person, at least so far as the same can be provided without doing
1348 Ill. App. 567, 109 N. E. (2d) 636 (1953).
2 I1. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 259.48, authorizes such practice.
3 Two questions were presented, to-wit: (1) was the defendant immune from
suit, and (2), if immune, did the carrying of liability insurance operate to remove
the immunity, either completely or partially to the extent of such insurance?
4 Kinnare v. City of Chicago, 171 Ill. 332, 49 N. E. 536 (1898).
5 Browning v. City of Springfield, 17 Ill. 143 (1855).
6 See Leviton v. Board of Education, 374 Ill. 594, 30 N. E. (2d) 500 (1940).
7 Parks v. Northwestern University, 218 Ill. 381, 75 N. E. 991, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.)
556, 4 Ann. Cas. 103 (1905).
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injury to the trust funds of the charitable enterprise. A partial waiver
of the immunity afforded to these corporations has been recognized in
those instances where liability insurance is present- on the theory the im-
munity is no longer needed to protect trust assets. It is not surprising,
therefore, to find the same rationale being carried over to apply to quasi-
municipal corporations as well.
STREET RAILROADS--RFGULATION AND OPERATION-WHETHER OR NOT
GENERAL STATUTE REQUIRING NOTICE TO TRANSIT AUTHORITY OF FACT OF
INiJURY APPLIES WHERE THE AUTHORITY HAS ASSUMED THE LIABILITIES OF
ITS PREDECESSOR TORT-FEASOR--In the recent case of Barrett v. Chicago
Transit Authority,1 the Appellate Court for the First District dealt with
the problem of whether or not a person injured by a street car, then under
the operation of the defendant's predecessor, was obliged to give notice
within six months of the injury in the fashion required by the Metro-
politan Transit Authority Act.2 Part of the consideration for the transfer
to the defendant of the street railroad property, which included a certain
damage reserve fund, was an agreement by it to assume all the obligations
of the predecessor. Plaintiff, at the time of his injury at the hands of the
predecessor, had been four years of age. When he reached his majority,
he sued the successor corporation but his suit was dismissed in the trial
court, on the motion of defendant, because of an apparent lack of notice.
On appeal from that judgment, the Appellate Court reversed and re-
manded on the basis that the suit rested upon the contract for the assump-
tion of liability and was different from a personal injury suit, hence the
notice provision of the statute was inapplicable.
The giving of notice concerning the commission of a tort, or of acts
leading to the development of a cause of action, is not customarily re-
quired in law nor is such a notice deemed necessary as a condition prece-
dent to the institution of suit. This principle is true not only as to private
individuals but as to corporations, both public and private,' although it
is clear that the legislature is competent to impose such a requirement, at
least as to public4 and quasi-public corporations.5 Statutes seeking to im-
8 Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N. E. (2d) 81 (1950), noted in 28 CHICAGO-
KENT LAW RWivIEw 268, 38 11. B. J. 581. See also DeFeo and Spencer, "After
Moore v. Moyle; Then What?" 29 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 107-19 (1951).
1348 Ill. App. 83, 107 N. E. (2d) 859 (1952).
2 111. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 111%, § 341.
3 See note in 27 N. Car. L. Rev. 145.
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 1-11, relates to notice in personal injury
actions against municipalities.
5 The notice provisions of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 111%, § 341, applicable
to personal injury suits against the Chicago Transit Authority, were held consti-
tutional in Schuman v. Chicago Transit Authority, 407 Ill. 313, 95 N. E. (2d) 447
(1950).
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pose the requirement of notice, however, being in derogation of the com-
mon law, will be strictly construed, 6 although they may, if not otherwise
limited, be regarded as being applicable to suits conducted on behalf of
minors as well as to those begun by adults.7 Even so, statutes of this
character will not be expanded beyond their scope so, if limited to suits
for injury to person,8 the same will not be made to control contract actions.
It was, therefore, purely by virtue of the existence of the assumption
agreement that the plaintiff in the instant case, being a contract bene-
ficiary, was permitted to succeed. The doctrine of the case should, for that
reason, be distinguished from the one likely to be applied in the event a
tort suit should be brought by a minor.9
6 Northern Illinois Coal Corp. v. Langmeyer, 342 Ill. App. 406, 96 N. E. (2d) 820
(1951). But see Kennedy v. City of Chicago, 340 Ill. App. 100, 91 N. E. (2d) 138
(1950), noted in 28 CHIOAGo-KENT LAW REVIEw 380.
7 The abstract opinion in Calabrease v. City of Chicago Heights, 189 Ill. App. 534
(1914), would indicate that a parent, seeking to recover for loss of services of a
minor child, is not required to give notice, since no injury would have been done
to his, the parent's, person. The case implies that a notice would be necessary in
the event the minor were to sue for his own injury. See also Martin v. School
Board of Union Free Dist. No. 28, 301 N. Y. 233, 93 N. E. (2d) 655 (1950).
8 The text of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 1-11, relating to municipalities,
and Vol. 2, Ch. 111%, § 341, referring to the Chicago Transit Authority, includes
the phrase "injury to his person." Dictum in the case of People v. Chicago Transit
Authority, 392 Ill. 77, 64 N. E. (2d) 4 (1945), indicates that the two notice
provisions are identical.
9 A parallel problem regarding minors' claims for workmen's compensation is
dealt with in the case of Ferguson v. Industrial Commission, 397 Ill. 348, 74 N. E.
(2d) 539 (1947).
